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In most laboratory experiments concerning prosocial behavior subjects
are fully informed how their decision influences the payoff of other players.
Outside the laboratory, however, individuals typically have to decide without
such detailed knowledge. To asses the effect of information asymmetries
on prosocial behavior, we conduct a laboratory experiment with a simple
non-strategic interaction. A dictator has only limited knowledge about the
benefits his prosocial action generates for a recipient. We observe subjects
with heterogenous social preferences. While under symmetric information
only individuals with the same type of preferences transfer, under asymmetric
information different types transfer at the same time. As a consequence
and the main finding of our experiment, uninformed dictators behave more
prosocially than informed dictators.
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1. Introduction
In experiments such as the Ultimatum Game, the Trust Game, or the Dictator Game
subjects regularly deviate from a selfish maximization of payoffs and behave prosocially
(Camerer, 2003). The laboratory experiments providing evidence for social preferences
are conducted in an environment where agents have full information about the costs and
benefits for everyone. However, outside the lab, in many situations where people behave
prosocially, individuals are better informed about how their decisions affect their own
payoff than how they affect others.
Let us consider charity. While a donor has a clear idea of his own costs, he often is
not certain about the actual consequences of his decision to donate. For instance, when
donating to aid organizations in developing countries, donors may be concerned whether
the money is spent on the most effective projects and not just wasted. Or they may be
concerned that money designated to help people who need the money the most ends up
in other pockets.
Consider another example: redistribution through the tax system. There is exper-
imental evidence that prosocial concerns are important when individuals collectively
decide about taxes and redistribution (e.g., Tyran and Sausgruber, 2006; Sauermann
and Kaiser, 2010; Höchtl et al., 2012). While subjects face strategic uncertainty in these
experiments, they are perfectly informed about the payoff consequences for others. In
the field, individuals have fewer information at hand when making a decision. They will
be well informed how they themselves are affected, but they do not necessarily know the
exact consequences for others, let alone the overall effect on the income distribution.
In this paper, we investigate the prosocial behavior of a dictator who is only im-
perfectly informed about the consequences of his decisions on others. We conduct a
laboratory experiment with the following design. Two subjects, A and B, are matched;
both subjects have an initial endowment; A makes a binary decision whether or not to
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make a monetary transfer to B. The transfer causes known costs for A and benefits for
B, with the benefits being larger than the costs. As treatment we vary the information
A has about the benefit level. While A is informed about the exact level of the benefit
in the control setting, he does not know the exact level of it in the treatment.
Our main finding is that, on average, subjects A behave more prosocially when they
do not know the benefit level compared to the situation when they know the bene-
fit level. More subjects transfer under asymmetric information than under symmetric
information.
We provide a simple explanation for this finding based on social preference theories.
Under symmetric information a substantial share of individuals (40%) behaves proso-
cially and they are heterogeneous in their preferences. Subjects A, whose choices are
consistent with inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), transfer only up to a cer-
tain benefit level, so that the payoffs of players B do not exceed that of players A. In
contrast, subjects A, whose choices are consistent with an efficiency concern or maximin
preferences (Charness and Rabin, 2002), transfer only starting from a certain level of
benefit, when the degree of efficiency is sufficiently high. Hence, in our setting they
rarely transfer simultaneously under symmetric information. Under asymmetric infor-
mation, however, both types transfer at the same time even though they face a risk what
benefit level realizes in the end.
Our results give a novel perspective on the social preference literature. In contrast
to populations of selfish individuals where the effect of asymmetric information is well
understood, in a population with prosocial individuals the effect is not straightforward.
With our experiment we provide evidence that results can realize which are counterintu-
itive at first glance but in fact can be explained by existing theories. When different types
of prosocial preferences are present in a population, then, depending on the frequency
of types and the intensities of their prosocial concern, we can obtain significantly more
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prosocial decisions under asymmetric information than under symmetric information.
To the best of our knowledge we provide the first experimental design in which an
information asymmetry regarding the degree of efficiency is introduced in a basic non-
strategic setting. In contrast to existing experiments, in our work only the information
available to the dictator varies, while B is fully informed. A′s decision neither makes
his own payoff nor B′s payoff more risky.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the related literature.
In Section 3, we present the experimental design followed by a discussion of behavioral
hypotheses in Section 4. We present in the main results in Section 5. In Section 6 we
provide robustness checks for our results and conclude in Section 7.
2. Related Literature
The experimental evidence regarding prosocial behavior in simple two-persons experi-
ments such as the Trust Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Dictator Game is exten-
sive. The central and robust findings demonstrate that subjects regularly deviate from
purely selfish behavior though to varying degrees (e.g., Camerer, 2003).
A few papers (e.g., Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993; Rapoport and Sundali, 1996; Huck,
1999; Güth et al., 1996) introduce asymmetric information regarding the amount of
money to be distributed in simple two-persons dictator games. In contrast to our ex-
periment, however, the asymmetric information is on the recipient side. Only in Klempt
and Pull (2009), the information asymmetry is on the side of the proposer. In this paper
an uninformed proposer runs a risk that the demand of a too high share to himself leads
to a his own transfer equal to zero when the actual amount of money to be distributed
is small.
The first treatment in Dana and Weber (2007) presents an experiment similar in design
to our paper with regard to the information asymmetry. In their setting, a dictator has
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to make a choice between two allocations where he initially only observes his own payoff
but does not observe the recipient's payoff. Dictators can choose to be informed about
the recipient's payoff before they make a decision while the recipient is neither aware of
the dictator's choice to find out the information nor of his transfer decision. Dana and
Weber (2007) find that a significant share of dictators prefer to remain uninformed and
more often decide to behave selfishly compared to the benchmark where dictators are
informed about the recipient's payoff right from the beginning. Hence, Dana and Weber
(2007) provide evidence that subjects just want to appear as prosocial instead of truly
being altruistic.1
In our experiment a recipient is perfectly informed about the level of his benefit in the
case of prosocial decision and about dictators' behavior. The dictator, in contrast, does
not know the benefit level and he has no possibility to find it out. Moreover, in Dana and
Weber (2007) the choices that imply the more equal and the efficient distribution are
the same. In our case, while the choice is always efficiency increasing, its distributional
consequences vary over different values of b.
A recent strand of literature (Brock et al., 2013; Brennan et al., 2008; Güth et al., 2008;
Bradler, 2009) investigates how risk regarding other subjects' payoffs affects prosocial
behavior. Brock et al. (2013) design an experiment where the dictator can choose to give
up some of his payoff in oder to increase payoff chances of the recipient. The goal of their
experiment is to evaluate whether ex-ante or ex-post fairness concerns are relevant for
dicators' decisions under risk.2 They find that decisions are not only driven by ex-post
concerns (as in the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999)) but also by ex-ante concerns. In
the experiment of Brennan et al. (2008), a dictator has to make choices among lotteries
1There are several other papers that investigate whether subjects are more selfish when the actions of
dictators are not fully observable (e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) and the multiple dictator
treatment as well as the plausible deniability treatment in Dana and Weber (2007)). They find a
significantly less generous behavior of dictators relative to the standard game thus also supporting
the view that subjects are not truly prosocial but want to appear as such.
2On social preferences and ex-ante as well as ex-post fairness concerns see the axiomatic treatment of
Fudenberg and Levine (2012).
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over his and recipients' payoffs. Hereby, attitudes towards private and collective risks
can be evaluated. Each dictator is required to evaluate four different allocations. Each
allocation assigns a payoff to the dictator and to the recipient either in a probabilistic or
in a deterministic way.3 The experiment shows that dictators' behavior is significantly
different when they face risks regarding their own payoff compared to a situation with no
risk for them personally. Yet, the authors do not find evidence that the risk, recipients
are exposed to, affects dictators' decisions.4
In our setting, under asymmetric information the dictator has to make a decision when
he does not know the already determined payoff for the recipient while in Brock et al.
(2013); Brennan et al. (2008); Güth et al. (2008) dictators affect the payoff risks/chances
of others. In Brock et al. (2013) dictators' choices are between giving up some of their
payoff in order to increase payoff chances of recipients. In Brennan et al. (2008); Güth et
al. (2008) two different kinds of risk concerns regarding the others' payoff are intertwined.
First, as those papers posit, it may be that dictators put themselves in the shoes of others
and do not want to expose recipients to risk. Secondly, however, if subjects exhibit
social preferences based on outcomes, then they face a risk themselves. When choosing
a lottery, they face an uncertain outcome regarding the others' payoff directly affecting
their own utility. In the above designs, both effects are mixed up and not distinguishable.
Moreover, a dictator is exposed to direct risks that affect his own payoff as well, which
can influence his attitude towards the risk of the recipient. In our approach the exposure
of the recipient to a possible risk and the influence of the direct risk on the dictator are
absent which allows us to separate out the effect we are interested in: an uncertain
outcome regarding the others' payoff.
3Güth et al. (2008) conducted a similar experiment where they added another dimension: time pref-
erences.
4Rohde and Rohde (2011) similarly find only weak evidence that the risk, recipients' are exposed to,
influences dictators. Results by Bradler (2009) indicate that subjects are willing to risk parts of
their own payoff when they can thereby increase the payoff of the recipient from zero or from a very
small amount.
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Baseline
Sessions
Robustness
Sessions
Treatments
Part 1 Part 4 b is not known to A
Part 2 Part 2 b is not known to A. A re-
ceives a reward if he trans-
fers.
Part 3 Part 3 b is known to A. A receives
a reward if he transfers.
Part 4 Part 1 b is known to A.
Table 1: Overview over the Sequence of Treatments in the 4 Parts of the Experiment.
3. Experimental Design
We implement the following experimental design. There are two agents, A and B. A
has an endowment, eA, of 100 points (100 points are equivalent to 10 EUR), B has
an endowment, eB, of 50 points. Only A makes a (binary) decision. He can decide
whether he wants to transfer 20 points. If A transfers, B receives a benefit b, with
b ∈ {25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70}. We choose such initial endowments that a transfer always
results in an efficiency gain and a decrease in inequality for low values of b (b ≤ 30).
For values of b > 30 inequality increases in b. Hence, depending on the exact value of
b a decision to transfer can be motivated by a concern for efficiency or by a concern for
equality.
The experiment consists of 4 parts. Table 1 provides an overview over the parameters
that change in each part.5
3.1. Treatments
The main treatment variable in our experiment is whether A knows the exact benefit b
when he makes a decision or whether his knowledge about b is limited to the distribution
from which b is drawn.
5See Section 6 for a discussion of the robustness sessions.
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In part 1, participants A have to make a decision under asymmetric information with
respect to b. The exact value of b is determined in the following way. Participants are
presented an urn from which a value for b is drawn before subjects make a decision. The
urn contains the following balls each representing one value of b: 25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70.
Agent A is not informed about the ball which is drawn while it is disclosed to agent B.
Moreover, it is commonly known that B observes the exact benefit. Subjects make only
one decision whether to transfer or not.
In part 4, participants A make decisions under symmetric information. That is, each
A knows the exact value of b. We use the strategy method to elicit a complete response
by subject A for each value of b (25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70). This is crucial because it allows
us to describe the values of b for which subjects are willing to transfer under symmetric
information and whether their behavior is consistent with their decision under asymmet-
ric information. Subjects have to make one decision (transfer yes/no) for each level of b.
After they had made their decisions, one ball from the urn was drawn and determined
which decision was payoff-relevant for part 4.
Part 2 (3) is identical to part 1 (4), but as an additional treatment we introduce a
reward for A if he transfers 20 points. There exists substantial experimental evidence
that incentives can crowd out prosocial behavior (e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000;
Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997).6 We want to test whether the incentive has the same
effect under symmetric and asymmetric information. Under asymmetric information the
incentive could interact with the uncertainty. Subjects could perceive the reward level
as being related to the unknown benefit level and interpret the reward as a signal (Bolle
and Otto, 2010). In part 2, the reward r could take on two values, rL = 5 and rH = 10.
The subjects only know that r ∈ {5, 10} and that the exact value of r was determined
after b had been drawn, but they do not know how the reward was chosen. In fact,
6See Bowles and Polanía-Reyes (2012); Gneezy et al. (2011) for surveys of the literature.
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the reward was determined by a lottery after b had been drawn.7 After the reward is
determined, all subjects are informed about the exact value of r. In part 3, the reward
was fixed with r = 5. Before making a decision, subjects always observe the exact value
of r.
At the end of the experiment, one of the four parts was randomly drawn. This part
determined the final payoff of participants.
In our experiment subjects participate in different treatment conditions sequentially.
It is therefore possible that decisions in part 2 - 4 are influenced by previous rounds.
To control for this possibility, we ran robustness sessions where we change the order of
treatments (see Table 1).
As, qualitatively, results are very similar in the baseline and the robustness sessions,
we pool the sample and use it for our main analysis. To avoid confusion, in the main
analysis, we refer to part 1 comprising all observations under asymmetric information
without reward from baseline and robustness sessions (and analogously for part 2, 3,
and 4). In Section 6.2 we investigate the two samples separately.
3.2. Procedural Details
Subjects were randomly assigned to either role A or role B at the beginning of the
experiment.8 They kept this role over the course of the experiment. Subjects knew that
the experiment comprised four parts, but they did not know the content of each part in
advance. Subjects received separate instructions at the beginning of each part.
We ran five baseline sessions with 90 subjects and three more robustness sessions
with 60 subjects. The experiments were conducted at the experimental laboratory at
the University of Mannheim in March  May 2012 (baseline sessions) and in November
7The probability is 1/10 for the high reward and 9/10 for the low reward. In all sessions r = 5 was
drawn
8Subjects B had no decision to make in the experiment, but we elicited their beliefs about what they
thought subjects A would do.
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2012 (robustness sessions). The experiment was computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher,
2007). Subjects were students from different fields at the University of Mannheim.
They were recruited using the online system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Each session took
between 35 and 40 minutes and comprised 16-20 subjects. The average earnings were
7.80 EUR.
4. Behavioral Predictions
Our main question is how the introduction of asymmetric information influences ag-
gregate and individual behavior. Do subjects transfer more often or less often under
asymmetric information?
We begin with a discussion how subjects A behave under symmetric information
(part 4). We do not expect that behavior will follow only one type of preferences as
heterogeneous types have been found in other experiments (see, for instance, Kamas
and Preston, 2012; Engelmann and Strobel, 2007). We focus on three possible motives
for prosocial behavior that are prominent in the literature: efficiency concern, maximin
preferences (Charness and Rabin, 2002), and inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999).9
When subjects have a concern for efficiency, they will trade-off their costs with the
benefits and the consequent efficiency gain. Hence, the more an individual i cares for
efficiency the lower the minimal value of b for which i would transfer. Thus, subjects
with an efficiency concern should exhibit the following transfer pattern. Either they do
not transfer at all or they transfer for a particular value of b∗ and all values b > b∗.
The transfer pattern of subjects with maximin preferences is similar to the transfer
pattern of efficiency concern. Either they do not transfer at all, or they transfer for a
particular value of b∗ and all values b > b∗. In contrast to efficiency concern, there are
9Cf. Appendix B for a detailed analysis of the utility functions.
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only two thresholds: either b∗ = 30 or b∗ = 25.
The specification of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) can lead to behavior consistent with
transfers for low values of b but no transfers once the benefit level is above 50.
What behavior can we expect for different types of social preferences under asymmetric
information? Under asymmetric information A does not know the value of b. Given
the lottery which determines the value of b, the expected value is roughly 45. The
utility functions we consider are not linear (apart from efficiency concern), but given
our parameters they imply that under asymmetric information subjects behave as under
symmetric information when the benefit is equal to its expected value. Subjects transfer
if and only if they transfer under known b = 45.
However, under asymmetric information subjects face a risk. If they transfer, a value of
b can realize for which they would not transfer if they knew it for certain. Alternatively,
they can behave selfishly and do not transfer. Then, they risk that they choose not to
transfer for a value of b under which they would transfer if they had the information
available. As it is the case with decisions where solely their own payoff is at risk, subjects
in our design may be affected by the risk regarding the other's payoff and deviate from
the CR/FS predictions.10 In this case, we will observe a more selfish behavior at the
individual level when they are negatively affected by risk.
So far, we assumed that the subjects' behavior follows the standard approach: maxi-
mization of utility functions with the additional ingredient of social preferences. There
is, however, an alternative approach based on cognitive dissonance theory (Konow, 2000)
which has been used to explain behavior in the dictator game and which could become
relevant in particular under asymmetric information. According to this theory, subjects
want to achieve a high payoff for themselves and to behave fair at the same time. They
experience dissonance when decisions have to be made where these two objectives are
10Note that neither Fehr and Schmidt (1999) nor Charness and Rabin (2002) discuss the possibility of
risk regarding the others' payoffs and it is not obvious how to implement it within their framework.
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in conflict. Moreover, [t]he agent is motivated to reduce dissonance and may, gener-
ally speaking, do so by altering behavior, e.g., when the dictator takes less, and/or by
changing beliefs, e.g., when the dictator believes it is fair to take more than the fair
amount. (Konow, 2000, p. 1076). Under symmetric information subjects are exposed
to dissonance of being nice and keeping the money for themselves. Under asymmetric
information the dissonance may be partly resolved by the uncertainty about b. Subjects
have some moral wiggle room (Dana and Weber (2007)) to justify selfish behavior,
because values of b may realize under which the subjects feel less compelled to transfer.
Hence, they may reduce transfers compared to the symmetric information situation and
behave less prosocially than the CR/FS predictions.
5. Results
Do subjects behave differently under symmetric and asymmetric information? The first
bar in Figure 1 depicts the fraction of individuals transferring in part 1 under asym-
metric information. Comparing it to the behavior under symmetric information (part
4, represented by bars 2 to 7), especially to the intermediate benefit levels, subjects
are more likely to transfer money. Under symmetric information for benefit levels from
b = 25 to b = 70 only 20, 17, 15, 21, 23 and 28% of all subjects are willing to transfer
money compared to 31% under asymmetric information.
Table 2 depicts results of an OLS regression with the individual transfer decision as
dependent variable. As independent variables we include the benefit levels under sym-
metric information, the omitted category is the decision under asymmetric information.
The regression confirms what the graph already pointed to. Fewer prosocial decisions
are made under symmetric information compared to the case of asymmetric information.
The differences for benefit levels below 60 are statistically significant.11
11We also estimated a random effects model (not reported here). The results are very similar. Further-
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Figure 1: Percentage of Transfers - Asymmetric vs Symmetric Information
Notes: The figure depicts the share of subjects A who transfer. The
first bar refers to transfers under asymmetric information without
reward. Bars 2-7 depict transfers for each level of benefit under
symmetric information without reward. N = 75.
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Table 2: Dictators' Transfer Decision
(1)
Transfer when benefit=25 (=1) -0.107**
(0.0525)
Transfer when benefit=30 (=1) -0.133***
(0.0480)
Transfer when benefit=40 (=1) -0.160***
(0.0469)
Transfer when benefit=50 (=1) -0.0933*
(0.0474)
Transfer when benefit=60 (=1) -0.0800
(0.0496)
Transfer when benefit=70 (=1) -0.0267
(0.0539)
Constant 0.307***
(0.0539)
N 525
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Table reports results
from an OLS regression. Dependent variable is the individual trans-
fer decision. Explanatory variables are the benefit levels under sym-
metric information. The omitted category is the asymmetric infor-
mation case. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level.
Level of significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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From Figure 1 and Table 2 it is clear, that, on average, subjects are more willing
to transfer when they do not know the exact value of b. In the following, we discuss
why we observe this difference. It is a combination of several effects. First, we observe
heterogeneous transfer patterns as predicted by different social preference theories. We
can assign each dictator to one of four patterns.12 Selfish subjects who do not transfer
for any benefit level (60% of all subjects), subjects who transfer for all values of b and
whose behavior is thereby in accordance with a concern for efficiency as well as maximin
preferences (7%). Moreover, we observe subjects whose behavior is in line with an
efficiency concern but not with maximin preferences (20%) and subjects whose behavior
is in line with inequality aversion (13%).13
It is important to note that when b is known, different subjects transfer for different
values of b. For low values of b, subjects whose behavior is consistent with inequality
aversion transfer. They do not transfer, though, when the benefit reaches a certain
threshold. In contrast, subjects whose behavior is in line with an efficiency concern
transfer starting from a certain threshold. In Figure 2 we show that the share of indi-
viduals with inequality aversion or efficiency concern changes with the value of b.14
The second element that leads to higher transfers under asymmetric information is
as follows. As implied by the social utility functions most individual transfers are not
negatively affected by risk. According to these functions all subjects who transfer under
b = 40 and b = 50 should transfer under asymmetric information as well. We observe
eight such subjects (this number does not include 7% of subjects who always transfer,
regardless of b) and all of them transfer under asymmetric information. Hence, every
subject who should behave prosocially according to social preferences chooses to do
more, we did a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. For benefit levels 30 and 40 the null-hypothesis can be
rejected at the 1% level, for b = 25 and b = 50 at the 5% level, and for b = 60 at the 10% level.
12The assignment is based on behavior in part 4.
13We have 150 pairs and thereby 75 dictators. 40 are selfish, 15 behave according to efficiency concern,
5 to either efficiency concern or maximin preferences, and 10 according to inequality aversion.
14By definition the patterns for other groups are degenerate. Either subjects transfer for all values of
b or for none.
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Figure 2: Transfer Patterns for Different Values of b
Notes: The sample is restricted to those subjects whose behavior fol-
lows the prediction by either efficiency concern or inequality aver-
sion. The exact level of b is known. One subject only transferred
at b smaller than 40 but also for the value of b = 70 in part 4. We
assigned this subject to pattern inequality aversion.
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so. Moreover, we observe eleven subjects who transfer either under b = 40 or under
b = 50 under symmetric information. For these subjects both decisions, transfer and no
transfer, would be in line with social preferences under asymmetric information. In fact,
seven out of these eleven transfer. Lastly, we find 16 subjects who are not egoists but
transfer neither for b = 40 nor for b = 50, so they should not transfer under an expected
value b = 45. Eight of them transfer nevertheless. So, if at all, we find some evidence
for increased prosocial behavior under asymmetric information and there is no evidence
for a negative effect of asymmetric information.
Combining that, first, subjects are not negatively affected by asymmetric information
and, second, that the parameters of our experiment are such that two different types
of subjects separate for known transfers under symmetric information but both transfer
when the information is asymmetric, can explain the higher transfers under asymmetric
information.15
As a consequence, earnings for subjects B are substantially higher when A decide
under asymmetric information. Each value of b is equally likely and the unconditional
decision to transfer (0.31) is the same for all values of b. Under symmetric information,
each value of b is also equally likely as before. Yet, as subjects make a transfer decision
for each value of b, the conditional probability may vary over b and is smaller than
the probability under asymmetric information. Hence, players B have a higher chance
to obtain a transfer: 31% under asymmetric information versus 21% under symmetric
information.16 And their expected transfer is 40% higher: 10 points under symmetric
information versus 14 points under asymmetric information.17
15Given that we observe higher transfers under asymmetric information, it is also clear that the type
of information asymmetry we introduce is not sufficient to make subjects behave more selfish due
to more moral wiggle room as, for instance, in Dana and Weber (2007).
16Probability to obtain a transfer is equal to 16 (20 + 17 + 15 + 21 + 23 + 28)% = 21% < 31%
17E [b] = 16 (0.2 · 25 + 0.17 · 30 + 0.15 · 40 + 0.21 · 50 + 0.23 · 60 + 0.28 · 70) = 10 < 0.31 · 45 = 13.95
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6. Robustness Check
In this section we briefly discuss the effect of the reward and check for order effects in
the sequence of the four parts. All results can be found in the Appendix C.
6.1. Reward
The introduction of a reward in parts 2 and 3 has a positive effect. More subjects choose
to transfer money in part 2 compared to part 1 (cf. Appendix C.1, Figure 3). Mirroring
the positive effect, when the reward is withdrawn, we observe a negative effect. The
willingness to transfer decreases. For each value of b we observe fewer transfers in part
4 than in part 3. The results of an OLS regression (Table 5 in Appendix C.1) confirm
that the reward has a positive effect and that it is statistically significant.
We observe no crowding out effect, neither due to a framing effect nor due to sig-
naling. Moreover, treatments 2 and 3 serve as robustness check for the main treatments
1 and 4. When we compare transfers under symmetric and asymmetric information, we
observe the same behavior pattern as while comparing 1 and 4.
6.2. Sequence of Parts
As in our experiment subjects participate in different treatments in a sequence, it may
be possible that subjects' behavior is influenced by the order of treatments. To check the
robustness of our results, we ran three sessions with 60 participants where we changed
the order of the parts. Most importantly, we let subjects decide first under symmetric
information. Hence, we can compare this decision to the baseline sessions where subjects
decided under asymmetric information in part 1. In the main analysis we pooled this
data with the baseline sessions. In the following, we compare the two samples.
A direct comparison between transfer levels reveals that under asymmetric informa-
tion in the first treatment subjects transfer more than for each level of benefit b under
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symmetric information (cf. Appendix C.2, Figure 4).18
When we compare the baseline sessions with the robustness sessions, we find no sta-
tistically significant differences. Yet, small differences exist. In the robustness sessions
subjects transfer less in all treatments and the effect of asymmetric information is not
so strong (cf. Figure 5 and Figure 6 in Appendix C.2). The reasons are that, first,
we observe a smaller percentage of subjects with prosocial preferences. Secondly, we
observe a different composition of types. There are relatively more subjects with in-
equality aversion and fewer with efficiency concern. As a result, we have relatively less
subjects who transfer under b = 40 or/and under b = 50. Hence, it is not surprising that
the average willingness to transfer under asymmetric information is not so strong in the
robustness sessions. This result also serves as a nice illustration of the complex interac-
tion between heterogeneity of types and asymmetric information. Regarding individual
behavior, the reaction to asymmetric information is very similar in the baseline sessions
and the robustness sessions.
7. Conclusion
In most laboratory experiments concerning prosocial behavior subjects have plenty of
information available how their actions influence other subjects' payoffs. In this paper,
we investigate what results when individuals are only imperfectly informed. We compare
transfers when a dictator has perfect information about the benefit he generates for the
recipient with a situation where he only knows the distribution of benefits that may
realize. The recipient, however, is fully informed about the benefit he receives.
We find that (i) in this setting 40% of subjects behave prosocially and transfer, (ii)
20% of subjects make choices that are consistent with a concern for efficiency, 13% make
18For b = 30, b = 50, and b = 60 the difference is statistically significant (Fisher's exact test, p < 0.10)
and for b = 40 as well (Fisher's exact test, p < 0.05).
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choices which are consistent with inequality aversion, and 7% transfer independently of
the value of b, whose choices are therefore in line with an efficiency concern or max-
imin preferences, and (iii) under asymmetric information transfers do not decline. Even
though subjects face the risk of transferring at a benefit b which they would not choose
if they knew b for sure, the level of transfers is stable and in fact even higher than the
highest transfer level under symmetric information.
Our results suggest that individual behavior is not negatively affected by asymmetric
information. In the aggregate, subjects, whose behavior is either in line with inequality
aversion or with an efficiency concern, both tend to transfer under asymmetric infor-
mation. Consequently, more subjects transfer under asymmetric information than for
any b under symmetric information. Our results therefore do not provide evidence that
subjects exploit the uncertain benefit level in order to justify selfish behavior and in
order to resolve a cognitive dissonance.
The general lesson our results point to is the complex embedding of information asym-
metries in interactions when social preferences are not homogenous. In our setting,
asymmetric information leads to convergent choices and thereby increased prosocial be-
havior for subjects with different types of social preferences. However, one can also
think of situations where this will not happen, for instance with individuals who exhibit
different thresholds than the ones observed in our experiment, with allocations that have
a larger range of possible benefits, or with different lotteries. Then, under asymmetric
information overall support may not be larger than for each value of b.
There are several avenues for further research. To begin with, it would be inter-
esting to explore further whether in alternative settings asymmetric information can
produce opposite results where prosocial behavior decreases under information asymme-
tries. Furthermore, it would be of interest to consider strategic interactions where not
only one dictator makes a decision but the recipient or a whole group jointly has to make
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a decision. There is experimental evidence that social preferences influence individual
decisions when subjects have to decide collectively for or against policy proposals, in
particular in the domain of tax policies and redistribution (e.g., Tyran and Sausgruber,
2006; Sauermann and Kaiser, 2010; Höchtl et al., 2012). In the light of our results, it
would be interesting to extend our framework to a setting where a group makes a decision
by voting instead of one dictator deciding alone. Often, policy proposals are plagued
with information asymmetries - individuals will be better informed about how a reform
affects themselves than how it affects others - and we could explore how information
asymmetries affect prosocial behavior in this situation.
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A. Descriptive Statistics
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Table 3: Dictators' Transfer Decisions - Summary Statistics Baseline Sessions
Mean Standard Deviation Median
1st Part
Transfer (=1) .36 .48 0
2nd Part (with reward)
Transfer (=1) .4 .5 0
3rd Part (with reward)
Benefit=25: Transfer (=1) .24 .43 0
Benefit=30: Transfer (=1) .22 .42 0
Benefit=40: Transfer (=1) .22 .42 0
Benefit=50: Transfer (=1) .27 .45 0
Benefit=60: Transfer (=1) .33 .48 0
Benefit=70: Transfer (=1) .33 .48 0
4th Part
Benefit=25: Transfer (=1) .18 .39 0
Benefit=30: Transfer (=1) .18 .37 0
Benefit=40: Transfer (=1) .18 .39 0
Benefit=50: Transfer (=1) .24 .43 0
Benefit=60: Transfer (=1) .27 .45 0
Benefit=70: Transfer (=1) .31 .47 0
N = 45
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Table 4: Dictators' Transfer Decisions - Summary Statistics Robustness Sessions
Mean Standard Deviation Median
4th Part
Transfer (=1) .23 .43 0
2nd Part (with reward)
Transfer (=1) .2 .41 0
3rd Part (with reward)
Benefit=25: Transfer (=1) .27 .45 0
Benefit=30: Transfer (=1) .23 .43 0
Benefit=40: Transfer (=1) .2 .41 0
Benefit=50: Transfer (=1) .27 .45 0
Benefit=60: Transfer (=1) .27 .45 0
Benefit=70: Transfer (=1) .23 .43 0
1st Part
Benefit=25: Transfer (=1) .23 .43 0
Benefit=30: Transfer (=1) .17 .38 0
Benefit=40: Transfer (=1) .1 .31 0
Benefit=50: Transfer (=1) .17 .38 0
Benefit=60: Transfer (=1) .17 .38 0
Benefit=70: Transfer (=1) .23 .43 0
N = 30
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B. Derivations
In this section, we show under which parameters individuals are willing to transfer
with efficiency concern, maximin preferences, and inequality aversion. We begin with
decisions under symmetric information. Subsequently, we deal with the asymmetric
information case.
B.1. Symmetric Information
B.1.1. Efficiency Concern and Maximin Preferences
Following Charness and Rabin (2002), the utility of an individual i in the role of A is
U iA(piA, piB) = (1− λi)piA + λi
[
δi ·min [piA, piB] +
(
1− δi) (piA + piB)]
where piA and piB are the monetary payoffs of A and B, respectively. Parameter λ
i = 0
corresponds to purely selfish preferences. For 0 < λi < 1, δi = 0 means that prosocial
behavior is only driven by an efficiency concern, i.e., a desire to maximize total payoffs,
and δi = 1 means that prosocial behavior is only driven by maximin preferences, i.e., a
desire to maximize both players' minimal payoff.
Applied to our setting, subject i has to compare two levels of utility. The utility
U iA(100, 50) if i does not transfer:
U iA(100, 50) = (1− λi)100 + λi
[
δi50 +
(
1− δi) (100 + 50)] (1)
and for a given value of b the utility U iA(80, 50 + b) if i transfers:
U iA(80, 50 + b) = (1− λi)80 + λi
[
δi ·min [80, 50 + b] + (1− δi) (80 + 50 + b)] (2)
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For the sake of exposition, we focus on two discrete cases. Subjects either have a pure
efficiency concern (δi = 0) or have pure maximin preferences (δi = 1).
Efficiency Concern Given his individual parameter λi and the value of b, player i will
transfer if
U iA(80, 50 + b) > U
i
A(100, 50)⇔ λi >
20
b
. (3)
If λi > 4
5
, then individual i will transfer for all values of b. For 2
7
< λi < 4
5
let b∗
denote the lowest value of b for which i is willing to transfer. Note that b∗ is at least 70.
Individual i will transfer for b∗ and all values of b with b > b∗. If, however, λi < 2
7
holds,
then i will never transfer. Hence, subjects with an efficiency concern should exhibit
the following transfer pattern. Either they do not transfer at all, or they transfer for a
particular value of b∗ and all values b > b∗.
Maximin Preferences Subjects with maximin preferences will transfer the 20 points
if it holds that:
U iA(80, 50 + b) > U
i
A(100, 50)
(1− λi)80 + λimin [80, 50 + b] > 100− λi50
λi(min [80, 50 + b]− 30) > 20
λi >
20
(min [80, 50 + b]− 30)
If λi > 2
5
, i will transfer to achieve a more equal allocation for values of b > 25. If
λi > 20
45
, i will also transfer for b = 25. If, however, λi < 2
5
, i will not transfer as
selfishness motives dominate.
28
B.1.2. Inequality Aversion
In contrast to maximin preferences, the specification of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) can
lead to behavior that is consistent with transfers for low values of b but no transfers once
the benefit level is above 50.
The utility function by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for the two-player case is as follows,
U iA(piA, piB) = piA − αimax [0, piB − piA]− βimax [0, piA − piB]
with the assumption that βi ≤ αi and 0 ≤ βi < 1. To begin with, note that it holds
that UA(80, 80) > UA(80, 75) > UA(80, 90) > UA(80, 100) for all parameters as one can
directly see from the following equations (and using that αi ≥ βi):
UA(80, 80) = 80
UA(80, 75) = 80− 5βi
UA(80, 90) = 80− 10αi
UA(80, 100) = 80− 20αi
Hence, whenever an individual is willing to transfer for b = 50, he will be willing to
transfer for values of b < 50 as well. Next, we show that there actually exist parameters
such that subjects may transfer for b = 50.
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UA(80, 100) > UA(100, 50)
80− 20αi > 100− 50βi
βi >
2
3
For values of b > 50, however, no parameters exist such that individuals will transfer.
Suppose UA(80, 110) > UA(100, 50) held, then
UA(80, 110) > UA(100, 50)
80− 30αi > 100− 50βi
βi > 1
Yet, by assumption βi < 1. Thus, for b = 60 no admissible parameters exists, such
that a transfer makes an individual better off.
B.2. Asymmetric Information
Efficiency Concern Individuals with a pure efficiency concern have a linear utility
function. Hence, they are risk neutral and transfer under asymmetric information iff
they transfer under b = 45. Then, it holds that an individual i who transfers for b = 40
should transfer under asymmetric information. However, an individual who does not
transfer for b = 50, should not transfer under asymmetric information.
maximin Concern For maximin preferences, the hypotheses one can derive are simple
as one can actually only observe three patterns. Subjects either transfer for no value
of b, for all values of b, or they transfer for all values of b larger than 25. In the case
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that subjects do not transfer at all they should obviously not transfer under asymmetric
information. Similarly, if subjects transfer for all values of b, obviously they should
transfer under asymmetric information. If subjects only transfer for b > 25, there exists
a narrow parameter range of λ such that they should not transfer under asymmetric
information whereas otherwise they should.19 In our experiment, however, the last case
practically does not play a role because we do not observe subjects who transfer for all
values above b > 25 but not for b = 25.
Inequality Aversion We will proceed as follows. We will show it always holds that the
utility from transferring under asymmetric information E(UA(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES)
is smaller than the utility from transferring for b = 40 but larger than for b = 50 under
symmetric information, that is, it holds that UA(80, 90) > E(UA(piA, piB)|transfer =
Y ES) > UA(80, 100). Hence, if it holds that player i transfers for b = 50, i.e.,
UA(80, 100) > UA(100, 50), then it also holds that E(UA(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES) >
UA(100, 50). Thus, a transfer for b = 50 then implies that a player should transfer
under asymmetric information. On the other hand, if player i does not transfer for
b = 40, i.e., UA(80, 90) < UA(100, 50), it implies that E(UA(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES) <
UA(100, 50) and therefore a player will also not transfer under asymmetric information.
For αi, βi > 0 consider:
UA(80, 90)− E(UA(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES) =
80− 10αi −
(
80− 1
6
[
5βi + 100αi
])
=
40
6
αi +
5
6
βi > 0
19More precisely, when 120300 < λ <
120
295 . Then the utility from not transferring (100 − 50λ) is smaller
than the utility from a transfer with 30,40,50,60, or 70 (which is 80) but larger than the expected
utility 80− 56λ.
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Figure 3: The Effect of Reward on Transfers
Notes: Bar 1 depicts the difference between the shares of individuals
who transfer in part 2 and the share of individuals who transfer
in part 1. Bars 2-7 depict the differences between the shares of
individuals who transfer in part 3 and the share of individuals who
transfer in part 4 for each level of benefit. N = 75.
And lastly, as βi ≤ αi:
E(UA(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES)− UA(80, 100) =
80− 1
6
[
5βi + 100αi
]− [80− 20αi] =
−5
6
βi +
20
6
αi > 0
C. Additional Tables and Graphs
C.1. Effect of Reward
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Table 5: Dictators' Transfer Decision - Reward
(1)
Transfer when benefit=25 (=1) -0.0867**
(0.0430)
Transfer when benefit=30 (=1) -0.113***
(0.0388)
Transfer when benefit=40 (=1) -0.133***
(0.0334)
Transfer when benefit=50 (=1) -0.0733*
(0.0401)
Transfer when benefit=60 (=1) -0.0467
(0.0406)
Transfer when benefit=70 (=1) -0.0267
(0.0446)
Reward (=1) 0.0476**
(0.0197)
Constant 0.290***
(0.0462)
N 1050
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Table reports results
from an OLS regression. Dependent variable is the individual trans-
fer decision. Explanatory variables are the benefit levels under sym-
metric information. The omitted category is the asymmetric infor-
mation case. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level.
Level of significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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C.2. Robustness of Sequence
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Figure 4: Percentage of Transfers - Baseline versus Robustness Sessions
Notes: The figure depicts the share of individuals in the role of A
who transfer in the baseline sessions and in the robustness sessions
in the first part. The first bar refers to transfers under asymmetric
information (baseline sessions). Bars 2-7 depict transfers for each
level of benefit under symmetric information (robustness sessions).
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Figure 5: Percentage of Transfers - Baseline versus Robustness Sessions
Notes: The figure depicts the share of individuals in the role of
A who transfer for the baseline sessions and the robustness ses-
sions. The first bar refers to transfers under asymmetric infor-
mation. Bars 2-7 depict transfers for each level of benefit under
symmetric information.
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Figure 6: The Effect of Reward on Transfers - Baseline Sessions versus Robustness
Sessions
Notes: Bar 1 depicts the difference between the shares of individuals
who transfer with reward and the share of individuals who transfer
without reward under asymmetric information. Bars 2-7 depict the
difference between the shares of individuals who transfer with reward
and the share of individuals who transfer without reward for each
level of benefit under symmetric information.
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D. Instructions
The original instructions were in German. In the following, we provide an English
version.
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General Instructions for Participants 
 
 
You are now participating in an economic experiment. Please, read the following instruction 
carefully. It explains everything what you need to know for the participation in the 
experiment. If you have any question, please, just raise your hand. Your question will be 
answered at your workplace. Apart from that, any sort of communication during the 
experiment is forbidden. If you violate this rule, you will be excluded from the experiment 
and will not receive any payment. 
 
The experiment consists of four parts. You obtain a separate instruction for each part. 
 
In all four parts you can earn points. It holds that:  
 
 
10 Points = 1 Euro 
 
 
 
Your final payment will be determined by the payment earned in one out of the four parts 
comprising the experiment. At the end of the experiment, the experimenter draws from an 
urn. The draw will determine one out of the four parts for all participants. You will receive 
the payment which you earned for this part in cash. 
 
After each part you will be informed how many points you earned for this part. You obtain no 
information concerning the earnings of other participants. 
 
The Experiment 
 
 
The computer randomly assigns either the role of Participant A or Participant B to each 
participant. At the beginning of the experiment, your computer will inform you whether you 
are Participant A or Participant B. 
 
 
This assignment does not change during the experiment. Each participant will stay 
either Participant A or Participant B during all four parts of the experiment. 
 
In all four parts two participants, A and B, are randomly assigned to each other. 
 
In each part of the experiment, another Participant B is assigned to a participant A. As a 
result, the same two participants will never be assigned to each other more than once.  
 
No participant knows whom he is assigned to. That means all decisions are anonymous. 
 
 
 
Do you have any questions? If yes, please raise your hand. The experimenter will answer your 
question at your workplace. 
 
Please, read the instruction for part 1 of the experiment on the next pages. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
You obtain the instructions for parts 2 to 4 at the beginning of the respective part. 
  
 
 
 
 
Part 1 
 
Participant A obtains an amount of 100 points. Participant B obtains an amount of 50 points.  
 
 
The Decision of Participant A 
 
A has to decide if he is ready to spend 20 points in order to increase the payment of B by b 
points. That means instead of the amount of 50 points B obtains the payoff of 50 + b. A can 
spend either 20 points or nothing. 
If A decides not to spend 20 points, both participants obtain their original payoffs: A receives 
100 and B 50 points. 
 
The exact value of b is determined before the start of the actual experiment: the experimenter 
draws one ball from an urn.  
The urn contains the following balls, each represents one value of b: 
1 ball with b=25, 1 ball with b=30, 1 ball with b=40,  
1 ball with b=50, 1 ball with b=60, 1 ball with b=70 
Participant B will be informed on his screen which ball has been drawn. Participant A 
however, will not be informed about the exact value of b. 
 
 
 
The Decision of Participant B 
 
 
In contrast to Participant A, Participant B is informed about the exact value of b at the 
beginning of part 1. 
 
Participant B makes no decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Please, answer the following control questions. These question do not influence your 
payments and only serve to check if all participants understood the rules of the experiment 
correctly. 
 
 
Question 1. Assume that Participant A decides to spend 20 points. What will be the payoffs if 
the ball with b = 30 is drawn? 
Payoff for A: 
Payoff for B: 
 
Question 2. Assume that Participant A decides not to spend 20 points. What will be the 
payoffs if the ball with b = 50 is drawn? 
Payoff for A: 
Payoff for B: 
 
 
After you have answered the questions, please, raise your hand. The experimenter will check 
your answers at your workplace. When all the participants are ready, we start with the actual 
experiment. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Part 2 
 
 
 
Participant A obtains an amount of 100 points. Participant B obtains an amount of 50 points.  
 
 
The Decision of Participant A 
 
A has to decide if he is ready to spend 20 points in order to increase the payment of B by b 
points. That means instead of the amount of 50 points B obtains the payoff of 50 + b. A can 
spend either 20 points or nothing. 
If A decides not to spend 20 points, both participants obtain their original payoffs: A receives 
100 and B 50 points. 
 
The exact value of b is determined before the start of the actual experiment: the experimenter 
draws one ball from an urn.  
The urn contains the following balls, each represents one value of b: 
1 ball with b=25, 1 ball with b=30, 1 ball with b=40,  
1 ball with b=50, 1 ball with b=60, 1 ball with b=70 
Participant B will be informed on his screen which ball has been drawn. Participant A 
however, will not be informed about the exact value of b. 
 
If A decides to spend 20 points, he obtains a reward - r points. It holds that 5 points ≤ r ≤ 10 
points. The exact value of r will be determined after b is determined. Participant A will be 
informed about the value of r on his display. 
The Decision of Participant B 
 
 
In contrast to Participant A, Participant B is informed about the exact value of b at the 
beginning of part 1. Participant B will be informed about the value of r on his display. 
 
Participant B makes no decisions. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Part 3 
 
 
 
Participant A obtains an amount of 100 points. Participant B obtains an amount of 50 points.  
 
 
The Decision of Participant A 
A has to decide if he is ready to spend 20 points in order to increase the payment of B by b 
points. That means instead of the amount of 50 points B obtains the payoff of 50 + b. A can 
spend either 20 points or nothing. 
If A decides not to spend 20 points, both participants obtain their original payoffs: A receives 
100 and B 50 points. 
b can obtain different values. A has to make a decision for each of the following cases: 
 
1. b = 25 
2. b = 30 
3. b = 40 
4. b = 50 
5. b = 60 
6. b = 70 
In the end of part 3, the experimentator draws one ball from the urn, which will determine the 
decision problem, relevant for the payoff in this part of the experiment. 
If A decides to spend 20 points, he obtains a reward - r points. It holds that 5 points ≤ r ≤ 10 
points. Participant A will be informed about the value of r on his display. 
The Decision of Participant B 
 
Participant B makes no decisions. Participant B will be informed about the value of r on his 
display. 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Please, answer the following control questions. These question do not influence your 
payments and only serve to check if all participants understood the rules of the experiment 
correctly. 
 
 
Question 1. Assume that Participant A decides to spend 20 points. What will be the payoffs in 
the case (1)? 
Payoff for A: 
Payoff for B: 
 
Question 2. Assume that Participant A decides not to spend 20 points. What will be the 
payoffs in the case (4)? 
Payoff for A: 
Payoff for B: 
 
 
After you have answered the questions, please, raise your hand. The experimenter will check 
your answers at your workplace.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Part 4 
 
 
 
Participant A obtains an amount of 100 points. Participant B obtains an amount of 50 points.  
 
 
The Decision of Participant A 
A has to decide if he is ready to spend 20 points in order to increase the payment of B by b 
points. That means instead of the amount of 50 points B obtains the payoff of 50 + b. A can 
spend either 20 points or nothing. 
If A decides not to spend 20 points, both participants obtain their original payoffs: A receives 
100 and B 50 points. 
b can obtain different values. A has to make a decision for each of the following cases: 
1. b = 25 
2. b = 30 
3. b = 40 
4. b = 50 
5. b = 60 
6. b = 70 
In the end of part 3, the experimentator draws one ball from the urn, which will determine the 
decision problem, relevant for the payoff in this part of the experiment. 
 
The Decision of Participant B 
 
Participant B makes no decisions.  
 
 
 
  
